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The Multilateral Human Rights System:
Systemic Challenge or Healthy Contestation?
JOLYON FORD†

I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Human Rights Council (‘the Council’) is the
peak global institution of the existing multilateral legal order on the
promotion and protection of fundamental human rights. On June 19,
2018 the Trump administration announced that it would withdraw the
United States’ membership of the Council.1 A year previously,
relatively early in the Trump presidency, the administration had
clearly signaled in the Council that it saw future US participation in
that forum as potentially contingent upon certain reforms to the
Council’s membership and agenda.2 Nevertheless, the June 2018
announcement came the day after the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights had made statements in Geneva, in a formal yearlyreview speech to the Council, highly critical of US immigration
detention policy in respect of its southern border (forced separation of
children from undocumented arrival parents).3 Consequently, while
the withdrawal announcement ostensibly related to foreign policy
© 2020 Jolyon Ford.
†
Associate Professor, School of Law, Australian National University.
1. Michael Pompeo & Nikki Haley, Remarks on the UN Council (June 18, 2018)
(transcript available at https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-on-the-un-human-rightscouncil/).
2. Amb. Nikki Haley, Address to UN Human Rights Council (June 6, 2017) (transcript
available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2017/06/06/ambassador-nikki-haley-address-tothe-u-n-human-rights-council).
3. Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights), ‘Opening
Statement and Global Update of Human Rights Concerns’ UN Human Rights Council, 38th
Session,
Geneva,
18
June
2018,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23206&LangI
D=E.
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matters,4 some responses to the announcement explicitly emphasized
its timing and so implicitly, on one reading, linked the withdrawal to
political tactics in the context of intense immigration policy debate
within domestic US politics.5
This essay explores some of the parameters and merits of a
putative argument that the announcement of June 19, 2018 might
most properly be understood as but one manifestation of a wider
political backlash within the US (and indeed other Western
democracies)6 against the multilateral human rights system
epitomized by the Council. That line of argument—and the nature,
validity and utility of the ‘backlash’ characterization or concept in
international law and international relations more generally—were
partly the subject of a Fall 2019 symposium to which this essay
relates.7
There are two prongs to this argument, stylized here for sake of
analysis. First, populist-nationalist political sentiment at home
simultaneously fuels and is fanned by strident high-profile diplomatic
critiques (or even rejections) of global bodies such as the Council.8
Seen this way, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the
Council, in the temporal context of criticism of its immigration
policy, would appear to sustain a viable narrative of populist backlash
against a key institution of global governance. Second, so the
argument would run, the nature and force of this backlash constitutes
a systemic threat to the future of the post-1945 rules-based
international order, especially since it comes mostly from the
4. See supra note 2.
5. Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 745-46 (2018) (see for example the title of the
piece ‘United States Withdraws from the UN Human Rights Council, Shortly After
Receiving Criticism about its Border Policy’).
6. This essay focuses on the U.S. in this context, since some other perceived
challenges to the multilateral human rights system from other powerful states (such as China
or Russia) are more obviously the continuation of longer-term trends, whereas Western
democracies had hitherto largely supported that system (subject to the observations below
that US ambivalence towards engagement with the UN human rights system is neither
unanticipated nor necessarily new). This is an aside by the author.
7. See ‘The Populist Challenge to the International Legal Order’ Symposium,
University
of
Maryland,
18
October
2019,
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil_symposia/2019/; See also Mark Copelovitch
& Jon C. W. Pevehouse, International Organizations in a New Era of Populist Nationalism,
14 REV. INT’L ORG. 169 (2019).
8. An attempt to define ‘populism’ is beyond the scope of this essay. For one
overview: See Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, et al., The Oxford Handbook of
Populism (Oxford University Press, 2017); see also Copelovitch & Pevehouse, supra note 6,
at 170-75.
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superpower whose values-based rhetoric and leadership has perhaps
done most to advance the global human rights agenda in the modern
era. One can certainly debate whether this is an accurate account of
the US human rights record abroad. However, the influence of this
portrayal of the US as a global human rights champion along with the
practical importance of US funding to such bodies explains the
perceived significance of the US pulling out altogether from a peak
institution, and so explains the search for ways to try to understand
the move’s implications.
Part II of this essay offers three ways to frame the June 2018 US
announcement and subsequent withdrawal, from the perspective of
the international legal order for the governance of human rights: (i) as
above, as a new and systemic and potentially irreversible backlash
connoting a possible existential disengagement crisis for this order;
(ii) as a robust and notable but neither wholly novel nor systemicallysignificant development in a rules-based order that continues to
muddle through; and (iii) as contestation and engagement that might
be framed as potentially healthy for the future of the state-based
global human rights system and its universalizing ‘project’.
These framings relate to some different arguable ways to
approach or interpret this action, rather than either (a) analysis of the
conceivable domestic political or other drivers or motivators of that
action, or (b) analysis of the intended or the actual effects or impacts
of the withdrawal action on the institutional governance of human
rights at the international / multilateral level. Yet, given the
availability and objective relevance of these other ways of analyzing
the 2018 withdrawal, Part III’s discussion advances a number of
qualifying or contextualizing observations about the three framings
advanced here. The significance and complexity of those
observations illustrate why this brief essay’s ambitions must be
limited. It attempts to scope, in a preliminary way, some aspects of a
future research agenda around the content, empirical basis, and/or
utility of the ‘backlash’ motif in relation to human rights governance
at the international level.
Before proceeding, at least two possible broader perspectives
(that is, broader than the human rights context) might be said to flow
from the 2018 US withdrawal from the Council. One is that this
might represent a much wider disengagement on the part of the US,
beyond just the human rights sphere, from the paradigmatic
institutions of global and multilateral governance on a whole range of
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subject-matters.9 Another possible and indeed compatible perspective
would see the Council withdrawal as indicative of a broader global
trend of disengagement by many states from international
institutions, that is, one limited neither to the US nor to the human
rights institutional context.10
A full treatment of such perspectives lies well beyond the scope
of this essay, which focuses on whether the stylized ‘backlash’
concept above is workable as a frame for examining US
(dis)engagement with the Council and the constellation of related UN
human rights institutions. Still, those broader perspectives are, on one
level, somewhat inescapable. This is because the underlying genesis
of or motivation for this essay was, in part, an interest in exploring
whether the June 2018 withdrawal is best understood—from an
international lawyer’s perspective, rather than a scholar of US
political dynamics—as a narrow action (the significance of which is
restricted to the particular perceived institutional governance
problems within the Council), or as possibly representing some far
wider dynamic (a broader US turn away from leading or even
engaging with the rules-based international legal order more
generally). This wider possibility potentially arises because the late
20th / early 21st century emergence into global significance of the
institutions and discourse of human rights might be viewed as one
metaphor or example of the ‘globalization’ meta-trend itself. If so,
any ‘backlash’ against the multilateral human rights system might be
capable of being characterized as illustrating and/or being driven by a
far more general and profound reaction to and rejection of globalized
governance institutions and approaches well beyond human rights.
II. FRAMING ANY US ‘BACKLASH’ AGAINST THE GLOBAL HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEM
What follows are three non-exhaustive ways briefly to frame the
event or announcement under consideration in terms of what it might
represent—in a forward-looking rather than empirical or diagnostic
sense—about US engagement with the international human rights

9. Caroline Fehl & Johannes Thimm, Dispensing with the Indespensable Nation?, 25
GLOB. GOVERNANCE 23, 24 (2019); see also Ionut Popescu, American Grand Strategy and
the Rise of Offensive Realism, 134 POL. SCI. Q. 375, 376 (2019).
10. Catherine M. Brölmann et al., Exiting International Organizations, 15 INT’L ORG.
L. REV. 243, 256 (2018); see also Inken von Borzyskowski & Felicity Vabulas, Hello,
Goodbye: When do States Withdraw from International Organizations?, 14 REV. INT’L ORG.
169 (2019).
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architecture in the current era and the consequences for that system.11
The focus is not on how the 2018 withdrawal might be approached
from the perspective of party or other politics in the US domestic
context.
‘Negative: Systemic Threat’
The introduction above outlines the thrust of this potential way
to frame what June 2018 represents. It is captured in the materials
introducing the Fall 2019 Symposium (referred to above), which
stated that the “continued success [in the West] of populist ideas” and
populism’s “deep skepticism of international law and institutions”
poses “an urgent challenge” and indeed a “threat” to the global legal
order.12 On this approach, the US withdrawal constitutes ‘backlash’
conduct that cannot be characterized as mere critique of or discontent
with an institution or status quo, but instead represents “fundamental
resistance to and rejection of a system or institution of law” including
“aggressive steps to resist the system and to remove its legal force.”13
The US posture on the Council is, viewed this way, a systemic
rejection intended to deprive the multilateral system of its legal and
political force and effect, and with possible serious and significant
system-wide implications and effects.
‘Neutral: Business as Usual’
An alternative possible lens would yield a far less dramatic
diagnosis in terms of the future prospects of the international human
rights system. This lens would discern largely continuity rather than
change in US posture to participation in the Council, on which it has
long been ambivalent, and/or see the withdrawal as a particularly
robust but not entirely atypical form of systemic engagement and
contestation. This robust contestation is (on this view) endemic and
inevitable in something as inherently deeply political as a global body
on human rights standards, but is a form of engagement on human
rights and does not necessarily represent a threat to the future
11. For one framing exercise on the perceived backlash against international
adjudication and state withdrawals from international dispute settlement mechanisms: See
Joost Pauwelyn & Rebecca J. Hamilton, Exit from International Tribunals, 9 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 679, 686 (positing five different outcomes from withdrawal or threatened
withdrawal).
12. MARYLAND CAREY LAW, supra note 8.
13. See David Caron & Esm. . . Shirlow, Dissecting Backlash: The Unarticulated
Causes of Backlash and its Unitended Consequences, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MIXED BLESSING?, 160 (Andreas Follesdal & Geir Ulfstein eds.,
2018) (drawing on Cass R. Sunstein, Backlash’s Travels, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435
(2007)).
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existence of the Council or the wider order it sits atop.
‘Positive: Reform Opportunity’
Through a further alternative framing, what some might
characterize as system-threatening ‘backlash’ behaviors are instead
best understood as navigable and necessary challenges to a deeply
flawed but otherwise resilient and adaptive system. These challenges
were, on this approach, necessary for the system’s legitimacy and
effectiveness and may serve to stimulate international institutions, or
at least the underlying human rights agenda that they relate to, in
unforeseen beneficial ways (in terms of net objective progress on
progressive realization of universal enjoyment of human rights).
III. EXPLORING CHARACTERISATIONS OF THE 2018 US WITHDRAWAL
In the June 19, 2018 press conference announcing and
explaining the withdrawal decision, US Secretary of State Michael
Pompeo stated that the Council had become, from the
administration’s perspective, “an exercise in shameless hypocrisy”
with “some of the world’s most serious [human rights] offenders
sitting on the Council itself.”14 The US Ambassador to the UN Nikki
Haley added that the Council had become “a protector of human
rights abusers and a cesspool of political bias” particularly in terms of
“chronic bias against Israel.”15 Mainstream media coverage tended to
emphasize the anti-Israel bias dimension,16 and/or draw links to
immigration policy,17 although in terms the June 19 announcement
focused largely on the membership issue and did not, as such,
mention the previous day’s criticism in the Council of the

14. POMPEO & HALEY, supra note 6.
15. Id.
16. See Carol Morello, U.S. Withdraws from U.N. Human Rights Council Over
Perceived Bias Against Israel, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 19, 2018 5:59 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-expected-to-back-away-fromun-human-rights-council/2018/06/19/a49c2d0c-733c-11e8-b4b7-308400242c2e_story.html?;
see also Gardiner Harris, Trump Administration Withdraws U.S. from U.N. Human Rights
Council,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(June
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/politics/trump-israel-palestinians-humanrights.html.
17. See Sara Silverstein, The Price of America’s Withdrawal from the U.N. Human
Rights Council: Ignoring Human Rights for Migrants Could Mean that Civil Rights Are
Next,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(July
19,
2018
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/07/19/the-price-ofamericas-withdrawal-from-the-u-n-human-rights-council/.
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administration’s border control policy.18
1.

No system-threat backlash (Framing A)?

Politics scholars might conceivably seek to argue that the
administration’s action is best explained by, for instance, sensitivity
to criticism of its immigration detention policies, or by reference to
any related domestic political gains that might be had from attacking
and withdrawing from a UN body. The backlash against the Council
might perhaps be characterized as ‘populist’ in the sense outlined
above,19 for instance in that it is calculated—whatever the
‘consensus’ or objective long-term national interest—to appeal
politically to a nationalistic in-group nostalgic for a past when states
were independent of criticisms framed in terms of international
human rights law or at least immune from the related multilateral
architectures and diplomacy of human rights.20 Yet, this essay’s
perspective is one of international law, not US political science. From
this perspective, one’s intuitions as a human rights scholar might well
be that the US withdrawal was a cynical play to domestic political
audiences that risks damaging the global human rights agenda. Yet
for the reasons now outlined it is difficult to portray the decision as
representing a Type ‘A’ (above) systemic threat.
Official statements matter to international law in that under
certain conditions they help to comprise the normative content of this
legal system. In a joint statement, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo
and Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley, stated that the US “has no
opposition in principle to multilateral bodies working to protect
human rights [emphasis added]”, a “critical objective that reflects
America’s commitment to freedom.”21 They stated that the US did
not intend a retreat from human rights commitments, but “on the
contrary … our commitment does not allow us to remain a part of a
hypocritical and self-serving organization that makes a mockery of
human rights.”22 On its terms, this was an official expression of
18. See Nahal Toosi, US Quits UN Human Rights Council, POLITICO (June 19, 2018
6:56 PM CET), https://www.politico.eu/article/human-rights-council-united-states-donaldtrump-expected-to-withdraw/; see supra note 2 (the announcement did note that the US
would “not take lectures from hypocritical bodies”, which might be understood as a
reference to the 18 June speech in the Council).
19. See supra note 12.
20. Ted Piccone, U.S. Withdrawal from U.N. Human Rights Council is “America
Alone”, Brookings (June 20, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/06/20/u-s-withdrawal-from-u-n-human-rights-council-is-america-alone/.
21. See supra note 1.
22. Id.
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commitment to human rights, and not (as in Type ‘A” backlash,
above) an act of “fundamental resistance to and rejection of” that
system of law.23 The June 19th announcement chronicled the US
initiatives in and around the Council over 2017-2018, which was said
by the administration to comprise “good-faith” efforts towards
“major, dramatic, systemic changes” to reform the Council’s
membership and agenda-setting procedures to address problems as
perceived by the US as a Council member.24 The announcement
noted that the US would “keep trying to strengthen the entire
framework of the UN engagement on human rights issues”.25 While,
of course, such official statements might conceivably be shown to be
disingenuous, the withdrawal announcement on its terms does not
smack of a fundamental rejection of the human rights system. For one
thing, the US was withdrawing its membership, not denying the
existence or relevance of a global legal order.26 This is not necessarily
to defend the administration’s approach but is merely to question
whether this particular event is susceptible to characterization as a
“threat to the global legal order.”27 To argue that, one might have to
argue that the Council and the global human rights system are
synonymous, such that rejection of one involves rejection of the
other; on one view, the US rejected membership of a particular
institution, an architecture or artefact of human rights, not the
normative framework thereof.
The Type ‘A’ framing of ‘systemic threat’ may also not be an
appropriate approach because while US leadership and institutional
funding still matters (i.e. has impact) in global governance, US
disengagement from the Council may not in fact fundamentally
undermine or disable that institution or deprive it of force in global
affairs. There are three possible angles to this. First, the US is only
one member state and its participation or even financing may not be
‘indispensable’28 to the Council as a flawed but viable and now
continuing part of the international legal and diplomatic system.
Second, the Sunstein ‘backlash’ narrative29 to some extent assumes
that an irreplaceable global values leader has abandoned the human
23. See supra note 12.
24. See Haley, supra note 3.
25. Id.
26. Moreover, by withdrawing Council membership alone the US is not, did not in
terms, and is not necessarily legally able to simply absolve itself of human rights obligations
adhering to it in international law.
27. See MARYLAND CAREY LAW, supra note 8.
28. See Fehl & Thimm, supra note 10.
29. See Caron & Shirlow, supra note 14.
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rights cause, with fatal consequences for that system. Yet since at
least the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent events, it is hardly
obvious that the US has been highly influential or widely admired for
its human rights record abroad. This US credibility deficit means that
it does not follow necessarily that its Council withdrawal has or will
cause other states to collapse in dismay and discouragement and
themselves give up on the human rights cause. Third, a Type ‘A’
framing would perhaps assume that a powerful player has cut down a
vital institution in its prime (so to speak). Yet the Council is routinely
criticized by reputable pro-human rights activists for its many
imperfections and failings.30 In that sense, it is not obvious that the
US withdrawal has fundamentally undermined (i.e. in a Type ‘A’
system-threatening way) what stature, influence or efficacy the
Council might have enjoyed hitherto, precisely because the Council’s
credibility was not particularly high. For one thing, it was not
necessarily viewed as having resolved the many criticisms of its
predecessor UN institution.31 A far more troubling scenario might be
if the US was a credible and universally admired human rights
champion that withdrew from (and withdrew support from) a
flourishing institution that represented the epitome of a universal
values-based community under law. Yet in that scenario the
institution might well continue to operate well, in part because of the
limits to US indispensability and to post-Iraq US credibility on
international law (and human rights) outlined above. One might
qualify this wider point. This is because human rights advocates
critical of the Council might argue that principled participation
therein and the maintenance of symbolic rhetorical support for such
institutions still has value to the human rights project notwithstanding
the Council’s problems.32 Yet such a debate is no longer about
existential threat to a global normative system but about differing
30. See Strengthening the UN Human Rights Council from the Ground Up, HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(April
23,
2018,
4:00
AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/23/strengthening-un-human-rights-council-ground
(discussing the position taken by leading transnational human rights non-governmental
organizations not long before the June 2018 withdrawal). Some concerns expressed there
are in practically identical terms to the concerns outlined in the June 19, 2018 withdrawal
announcement. Haley supra note 2. For example, the “erosion of the Council’s credibility
when States responsible for gross and systematic rights violations are elected as members”.
31. See Adam S. Chilton and Robert Golan-Vilella, Did the Creation of the United
Nations Human Rights Council Produce a Better “Jury”?, 58 HARV. J. INT’L. L. 7 (2016).
32. See Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking, Introduction: The Regulatory Power of
the Universal Periodic Review, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW:
RIGHTS AND RITUALISM (Cambridge University Press, 2014), for a powerful scholarly
critique of a principal Council process that nevertheless notes the value of maintaining that
process.
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strategies for how, in institutional terms, best to give effect to the
values and principles of that system.
Perhaps the only argument that Type ‘A’ ‘backlash’ proponents
might have, then, is that by its symbolic exit (and more practically, its
financial one), the US has irreparably and in a system-threatening
way weakened the Council, or even the wider rules-based human
rights order. Another version of this argument might be that the
Council withdrawal cannot be seen in isolation from other US
diplomatic conduct in international legal and institutional fields well
beyond the human rights context, the cumulative effect of which is to
threaten the very idea of the Rule of Law at the global level whether
or not one is talking just in terms of human rights. I develop this idea
below, but on both counts it is not glib to state that it is probably too
soon to know.
2 . ‘Silver lining’ analysis (Framing C)?
In co-announcing the withdrawal, US Ambassador Nikki Haley
stated that the US would “continue to lead on human rights outside
the misnamed Human Rights Council”, keep trying to strengthen the
entire UN human rights framework, and “continue to strongly
advocate for reform” of the Council, upon which “we would be
happy to re-join it.”33 Again, one need not be an apologist for any
particular administration to observe that one way to frame the US
action is not as a systemic threat, but as a catalyst and opportunity for
reform. This is precisely so that the international human rights system
(whether or not manifesting in this sort of Council or that) might
more effectively and legitimately advance human rights respect,
protection and remediation by states and others. Above, it was argued
that one reason that the US withdrawal might not be systemthreatening is that the reputation, and expectations, of the Council
were not very high.
Framing ‘C’ is thus the perspective—perhaps somewhat
counter-intuitive for human rights advocates otherwise mostly critical
of the US withdrawal—that the real threat to the UN human rights
system was continuation of the status quo. Again, this is not to take
the administration’s word for it in terms of the Council’s deep
problems. It is because highly credible human rights scholars have
portrayed the statist international human rights system (and the
Council in particular) as, in part, an elaborate ritualistic set of
rhetorical reporting and other performances often with little practical
33. See Haley, supra note 2.
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significance for victims, participation in which serves to distance and
insulate states from their responsibilities even as they reiterate their
commitment to fulfil these.34
On this narrative, if the system was to survive or certainly to
flourish it needed and needs revitalization or reconfiguration, even
very robust contestation and questioning of its legitimacy or
effectiveness might only be productive. Again, it is probably too soon
to say if the US action has had this stimulus effect. Yet the Trump
administration’s ‘backlash’ against the Council might trigger a degree
of ‘pushback’ that invigorates the system globally, rather than the
contrary. Alternatively, unless institutions and systems never change,
a positive framing would see acts that are the possible incipient
elements of a new international human rights system, not necessarily
acts undermining an existing system. In his 2018 essay ‘The
Pushback against the Populist Challenge’, Kenneth Roth—the
Director of Human Rights Watch—argued that a fair assessment of
the global prospects for human rights should ‘induce concern rather
than surrender’, a ‘call to action rather than a cry of despair’.35 If
empirically we have witnessed a ‘backlash’ against the human rights
system by some Western states, we must also examine—insofar as
this is possible—the empirical case for a corresponding ‘pushback’
(by some states, or some actors within the ‘backlash’ states) in
support of this values-laden part of the rules-based international
order. Yet where we then find ourselves debating ‘pushback’ against
‘backlash’—and especially if we discern in empirical terms a
reciprocal pattern (or even cycle) of ‘backlash’ and ‘pushback’—we
must ask if we are merely in a particularly challenging but nonsystemic period of intense contestation, rather than existential
systemic survival. Of course, we could see ‘fundamental resistance’
to law that is system-threatening in its intent, but not in its effect. We
could call that unsuccessful or attempted Type ‘A’ backlash. This
brings us to the other framing outlined.
3.

Continuity not Change (Framing B)?

Focus on the withdrawal event may convey a ‘shock’ factor that
obscures the possibility that this particular action is better viewed as
exhibiting a degree of continuity rather than an outright change: a
significant but not unexpected or exceptional development, rather
34. See Charlesworth & Larking, supra note 33, at 1.
35. Kenneth Roth, The Pushback Against the Populist Challenge, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (2018), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/pushback-against-the-populistchallenge.
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than a new fundamental system-rejection posture. Successive
Republican administrations have expressed ambivalence (at best)
about the Council and its pre-2005 predecessor, the UN Human
Rights Commission, or at least about the nature and extent of US
engagement with these institutions.36 Indeed the George W. Bush
administration voted against the establishment of the Council at all in
the mid-2000s, on the grounds that it was not a credible body.37 This
position was one taken by an administration that was overt about US
support for human rights and freedoms globally. Seen in this context
it is thus not obvious that the later 2018 withdrawal decision
represents an outright rejection of international law and international
legal mechanisms as these relate to human rights. There may well be
a question of whether withdrawal is an effective tactic of
international diplomacy or pursuit of national or indeed shared
international interests. Some have argued that the June 2018 decision
was not particularly strategic,38 comes with ‘steep costs’39 or a toohigh ‘price’,40 was a ‘self-defeating’ move,41 or a ‘leadership
mistake.’42 Yet seen in the above historical context it does seem
rather harder to characterize the withdrawal as a threat to the
maintenance of a global legal order around human rights, as opposed
to one approach to that global legal order, upon which opinions will
differ as to whether engagement and membership are better
approaches.
There exists of course a significant caveat to this observation,
adverted to above. If a superpower disengages from and de-funds the
Council and does not in fact act on its undertaking to “continue to
lead on human rights” in the global arena, it is possible to reframe the
‘continuity and contestation’ narrative as one more resembling the
36. See generally Am. J. Int’l L., supra note 6, at 746.
37. Id.
38. See von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, supra note 11, at 344.
39. Steven Feldstein, The Steep Costs of America’s Exit From the U.N. Human Rights
Council, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (June 22, 2018),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/06/22/steep-costs-of-america-s-exit-from-u.n.-humanrights-council-pub-76676.
40. Sara Silverstein, The Price of America’s Withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights
Council: Ignoring Human Rights for Migrants could Mean that Civil Rights are Next, THE
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existential Type ‘A’ framing. This might be so if we avoid framing
‘backlash’ as a single event or impact imploding a system, and adopt
a more nuanced, time-lapse approach whereby systems come under
threat or are not supported or repaired or reformed or replaced, and a
legal order falls apart less perceptibly over time.43 If, in addition to its
Council withdrawal, the US also disengages from and de-funds a
significant number of non-human rights global institutions on
everything from oceans governance to trade to peacekeeping, one
could not continue to examine only the human rights context in
isolation.
In this sense, the rules-based international order may be less like
a ‘fragmented’44 bundle of net international commitments and
memberships and more like an integrated ecosystem underpinned by
a single normative commitment. If the US posture on the Council is
replicated across that ecosystem, and mimicked by allies and enemies
alike, the Type ‘A’ threat framing might begin to look more like a
viable scenario. Moreover, the framing of systemic threat might be
misleading in an ‘all or nothing’ sense. The threatened collapse of a
legal order might not eventuate and the legal order might survive, yet
it might be considerably damaged. It might crumble, decay, mutate or
be appropriated in ways that are deeply problematic in terms of the
shared goal of ‘more peaceful and inclusive societies’ in the 2030 UN
Sustainable Development Goals.
IV. CONCLUSION
Framing exercises such as undertaken here give rise to complex
and probably insurmountable empirical questions about what might
really be the causes, proper characterizations, and effects of events
such as US withdrawal from the Council, or trends such as weakness
in the UN human rights system. This essay has not attempted such
empiricism, which is always accompanied by the risk of the blindness
associated with first framing a problem and then going to look [only]
for evidence of that problem. The complexity of attempting causation
or correlation in global affairs should, in particular, suggest a need
for caution in relation to supposed links between domestic political
forces and actions or trends in global governance. The ‘pushback’
43. See James Crawford, The Current Political Discourse Concerning International
Law, 81 THE MOD. L. REV. 1, 21 (2018).
44. See Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report to the 58th Session of
the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
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motif reminds us that we must avoid an ‘all or nothing’ frame of
reference, since it is entirely conceivable that backlash and/or
backslide on human rights in some geographies or spheres of activity
might be accompanied by objective advancement of the ‘net’ human
rights project in others. Moreover, the timeframe for assessing
impacts might significantly alter one’s assessment of particular
events. Meanwhile, the framing exercise imports a rather obvious
normative choice, here to frame system-collapse as ‘negative’ and
revitalization of the UN architecture as ‘positive’. Concepts such as
‘backlash’ may obscure that what counts as ‘progress’ or
‘backsliding’ is likely to be deeply contestable and contested.
There are winners and losers of globalization, and winners and
losers of backlash and anti-backlash pushback. There may be upsides,
in terms of regenerative effects, to serious strains on the rule of law
and human rights institutions. This is especially so if we are prepared
to see apathy and complacency (in the West hitherto) as being as big
a threat to those values and systems as any deliberate sinister attempt
to undermine them. Finally, one way to conceptualize a ‘backlash’ is
that it implies a reaction that is expected or foreseeable, explicable,
understandable or even legitimate, and possibly a response to
someone or something over-reaching. It may be that academic
scholars in the intellectual global elite need to be careful about a
framing that suggests that a regrettable ‘backlash’ phenomenon is
being driven by certain reactive neo-conservative and/or neo-liberal
forces, without examining our own complicity in a system that may
be viewed (rightly or not) variously as patronizing, unresponsive,
over-promising, or empty-gestured. This is not just to remind us that
what is dismissed as ‘populist’ may also be ‘popular’ at least in
majoritarian terms. It is to remind us that we must not just decry
attacks on the rules-based order from within Western democracies.
We must also seek to understand how we might have lost the public’s
support in explaining, more digestibly and persuasively, the
supposedly ‘universal’ and ‘self-evident’ benefits of that order.

